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Research on the nature and causes, and later also on the indicators and fore-
casting, of business cycles has been a major part of the work of the National
Bureau of Economic Research almost from its beginning in 1920. This re-
flected the need of the times and continued under the administration of each
ofthe six NBER directors of resear~hor presidents: Wesley Mitchell, Arthur
Bums, Solomon Fabricant, Geoffrey Moore, John Meyer, and Martin Feld-
stein. Business cycles, viewed broadly as the major problem of economic
instability, constituted a central scientific interest of three of these men-
Mitchell, Bums, and Moore. Many research staff members and associates at
the National Bureau devoted major parts of their working lives to studies of
this subject.
5.1 A Wide Range ofInterrelated Studies
I think that most students ofthe subject would accept, though agreeing it is
difficult to prove, that the development of modem economic theory contrib-
uted importantly to the potential of economic policy by teaching the profes-
sion about the probable directional effects of different policy measures. Such
lessons are usually applied with lengthy lags, but publicly minded people
showed rather more receptiveness to them than many would have expected.
Beyond that, great advances in economic statistics and econometrics gave in-
creasingly powerful analytical tools to those concerned with quantitative eco-
nomic research and its applications to questions of policy. Both the quantity
This chapter is a slightly revised and heavily abbreviated version ofan essay written in 1970 to
introduce the first in a series ofcolloquia celebrating the National Bureau's 50th anniversary ("The
Business Cycle Today: An Introduction," in The Business Cycle Today, edited by V. Zamowitz
[New York: NBER, 1972]). In this form, the chapter is limited to a review of the NBER studies
ofbusiness cycles in the years 1920-70as related to some otherconcurrent work in the same area.
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and quality of economic data have increased immensely in what has been
termed "the statistical revolution" that in most countries started during the
Second World War.
No attempt can be made here to trace all these lines ofprogress, ofcourse,
but this is an appropriate occasion for recalling at least some of the more
important contributions of the National Bureau. These are by no means lim-
ited to the research classified specifically (and somewhat narrowly) as "studies
in business cycles." At the Bureau, and elsewhere, inquiries in various fields
have resulted in new materials and knowledge that proved helpful in dealing
with the problem ofeconomic instability.
That this is so can be seen most readily in the case of the massive studies
that have led to the development of systematic national income accounting
and its worldwide diffusion. Thanks in a large measure to these time-series
data, "there now exists in all Western countries a relatively well-organized
statistical universe to which our notions of development and stability re-
fer. . . . Economic reality is a product ofsystematic statistical observations in
a more serious sense today than it was during earlier decades (Lundberg 1968,
p. 16). The pioneering National Bureau work in this area goes back to the
earliest NBER publication, by Mitchell, W I. King, F. R. Macaulay, and
O. W Knauth, but the main contributions here are those by Simon Kuznets
and his associates, which appeared in the years 1937-46(Mitchell et al. 1921;
Mitchell 1922; Kuznets 1937, 1945; Kuznets, Epstein, and Jenks 1941,
1946). The great influence this research had on the development ofeconomics
since the 1930s is today generally recognized. 1
Other basic measures developed in National Bureau studies concern busi-
ness and household capital formation, consumption, and financing (Kuznets,
Fabricant, Goldsmith, Lipsey, Becker, Juster, and Shay); output, employ-
ment, labor force, productivity, prices, and wages (Fabricant, Kendrick, Wol-
man, Long, Easterlin, Mincer, Mills, Stigler, Rees, Kravis, and Lipsey);
money flows, interest rates, and the stock of money (Copeland, Macaulay,
Durand, Braddock Hickman, Conard, Guttentag, Cagan, Friedman, and
Schwartz); government, business, and consumer financing (Seltzer, Holland,
Kahn, Saulnier, Haberler, Moore); etc. 2 Without the groundwork laid by these
investigations, much ofthe recent economic research, particularly of a quan-
titative nature, would have been seriously impaired if not frustrated. This in-
cludes studies dealing with business cycle problems, some of them under-
taken by the authors who developed the materials just listed (e.g., Friedman
and Schwartz 1963a; Cagan 1965, 1966).
1. For example, Johnson (1967, p. 86) observes that Keynes's "original concept ofthe propen-
sity to consume was very strongly influenced by national income accounting (in fact, the devel-
opment of the Keynesian theory can be related fairly closely to the development of national in-
come accounting)."
2. This recital, though long, is very incomplete; for references see any catalog ofNBER publi-
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Ofcourse, in large part the Bureau's efforts in data collection and measure-
ment originated directly in the program of research on business cycles initi-
ated by Wesley Mitchell. Gradually, a uniquely rich library of well over two
thousand time series on almost every aspect ofeconomic activity was built up,
with full annotations, seasonal adjustments, measures ofcyclical timing, am-
plitude, conformity, etc. These data were assembled and used in the course of
many studies, including, in addition to those mentioned above, the massive
investigations by Mitchell and Bums of how to define, measure, and analyze
business cycles; research on cyclical movements in transportation by Hult-
gren, in inventories by Abramovitz and Stanback, in personal income by
Creamer, in consumption by Mack, in exports by Mintz; and studies of busi-
ness cycle indicators by Moore, Shiskin, Hultgren, Bry, and Zamowitz. 3 I
believe it is fair to say that the materials assembled and analyzed in all these
reports add up to a large proportion ofour factual knowledge ofhow the vari-
ous economic activities and aggregates behaved during the historically ob-
served sequence ofbusiness expansion, downturn, contraction, and uptum-
that is, in each phase ofthe uneven but pervasive fluctuations that marked the
process of the economy's growth. To be valid, the theoretical explanations of
economic growth and fluctuations must conform to the major facts disclosed
by these largely empirical studies; to be useful, they will also have to incor-
porate the more important and durable ofthe findings ofthis research.
Those engaged in the study ofeconomic fluctuations at the National Bureau
placed their hope in the cumulation ofeconomic knowledge: that their "quest
of the lessons of experience will aid other students, as well as laymen who
must wrestle practically with business cycles" (Bums [1946] 1954, p. 24).4
Their work has been primarily in the nature of basic research-on how busi-
ness cycles come about, vary, and interact with structural and operational
changes in the economy-because this strategy promised to contribute most
in the long run to the improvement of the analysis ofcurrent business condi-
tions, economic forecasting, and policies. There is evidence in support ofthis
strategy in the wide use made ofvarious tools and results ofthis research, for
example, the reference chronology of business cycle peaks and troughs, the
identification of mild and severe contractions, systematic amplitude differ-
ences among individual economic processes, and the classification ofthe lat-
3. Let me add to this sentence an abbreviated list of references (all are volumes in the NBER
series of Studies in Business Cycles: Mitchell 1927, 1951; Bums and Mitchell 1946; Hultgren
1948; Abramovitz 1950; Stanback 1962; Creamer and Bernstein 1956; Mack 1956; Moore 1961;
Mintz 1967.
4. Having illustrated some problems in business cycle research that are ofgreat importance to
those concerned with economic policy ("Whethera cyclical downturn can be recognized promptly
enough to permit immediate governmental intervention, whether cost-price relations are ofslight
consequence in the termination ofa boom, whether inflationary tendencies become important only
as 'full employment' is approached"), Bums continues: "True, the most painstaking studies of
experience will not always lead to conclusive answers; but they should at least narrow the margins
of uncertainty, and thus furnish a better basis than now exists for dealing with grave issues of
business cycle theory and policy" ([1946] 1954, p. 24).167 Research during the First 50 Years ofthe National Bureau
ter by characteristic cyclical timing. Serious criticism also appeared, but it
centered on the methodology of the Bureau's cyclical analysis rather than on
the substantive findings ofthis analysis. 5
Recent literature on the behavior, determinants, and influence of such key
economic variables as consumption, types of investment, prices, and money
shows continuing concern with a number of economic relationships explored
in the National Bureau reports. For example, fixed-investment functions in
most of the major aggregate econometric models employ profit variables that
have long been stressed in these reports. 6 The accelerator variables appear to
be working with rather long distributed lags in these functions, which is con-
sistent with the view that they explain long-run tendencies much better than
short-run behavior. 7 In the determination of inventory investment, the accel-
erator has a role to play, and an important nexus exists involving new and
unfilled orders, shipments, production, and price changes; this theme has re-
ceived much attention in the work ofAbramovitz, Stanback, Mack, and Zar-
nowitz and increasing recognition in more recent econometric studies. 8
In the theory of consumption, formulations that are consistent with obser-
vation ofboth the short-term instability and the long-term stability and higher
values of the proportion of income consumed have in effect superseded Key-
nes's simpler concept of a stable relationship between consumer expenditures
and current income. The failure ofearly postwar forecasts and Kuznets's data
(1946, pp. 52-54) showing a rough constancy of the share of capital forma-
tion in U.S. output led to doubts about the validity of Keynes's concept, at
least as an explanation of the long-run savings-income relation, and to the
emergence of the "relative income," "permanent income," and "lifetime in-
come" hypotheses of Duesenberry (1949), M. Friedman (1957), Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954), and Ando and Modigliani (1963). In empirical work,
lagged consumption or income terms and measures of assets or wealth are
now commonly included in the consumption equations. The National Bureau
5. Koopmans 1947, 1949; Vining 1949a, 1949b. This debate, with an HAdditional Comment"
by Koopmans 1957, is reprinted in Gordon and Klein 1965, pp. 196-231.
6. Cyclical changes in actual and prospective profits have a strategic part in Mitchell's Business
Cycles (1913). Mitchell viewed the encroachmentofunit costs on prices as one ofthe main factors
limiting the boom and, correspondingly, the improvement in the price-cost ratios and profit mar-
gins as one ofthe main factors limiting the contraction and stimulating the revival.
7. This view is well represented in the literature on the determinants of investment in capital
goods. See Bums 1952a, where tests by Kuznets, Tinbergen, and Hultgren are cited in support of
this position. (These tests, however, refer to the simple old version ofthe Haccelerator principle,"
which is now in disuse; recent and current studies employ instead the "flexible," or distributed,
lag forms of the accelerator.) The econometric models of Tinbergen, Klein and associates, and
Suits primarily use profits in their investment equations; some newer efforts such as the massive
Brookings-Social Science Research Council (SSRC) model rely more on the modem stock ad-
justment (accelerator) formulations. For references, see two survey articles: Nerlove 1966 and
Hickman 1969.
8. The Bureau reports include (in addition to the studies by Abramovitz, Stanback, and Mack
listed in n. 3), Zamowitz 1961, 1962; and Mack 1967. Other studies include Darling, Lovell, and
Fromm 1961-62; Lovell 1964; Eckstein and Fromm 1968; Courchene 1967, 1969.168 Chapter Five
was actively involved in these developments (NBER publications include
Brady and Friedman 1947; Modigliani 1949; Ferber 1953; M. Friedman 1957;
see Burns 1952b for a critical review ofthe pre-1952 contributions).
Studies of business cycle indicators, diffusion indexes, anticipations data,
and short-term economic forecasting all grew out of the Bureau's basic pro-
gram ofcyclical research, but their results are much more directly applicable
to the practical problems ofdecision makers in government and business. The
selection ofthe indicators was based on studies ofhundreds ofeconomic time
series and successive reviews ofthe results by Mitchell, Burns, Moore, Shis-
kin, and associates (see chaps. 10 and 11 for references and detail). Since
1961, up-to-date charts, tabulations, and various analytical measures for these
data have been published monthly by the U.S. Department ofCommerce. The
literature and the data on economic forecasts collected from a variety of
sources indicate clearly that the materials and techniques developed in these
studies have become important and widely used tools in the analysis and pre-
diction of business conditions.9 Here the story of the Bureau's efforts has a
linkage with the broader subject of the development and present state of eco-
nomic forecasting, which has recently become something ofa "growth indus-
try," reflecting the growth ofboth the economy and the concern with economic
instability.
5.2 Direction ofthe NBER Research in Business Cycles
Theories ofbusiness cycles deal with the effects and interaction oftwo sets
offactors, the exogenous disturbances (e.g., variation in weather, inventions,
wars, political and perhaps economic policy changes) and the endogenous
components of the economic system (quantities demanded and supplied,
prices, etc., usually collected in large aggregates by major categories ofmar-
kets or spending). There are some hypotheses that rely primarily on the first
set, attributing the cyclical movements ofthe economy to cycles in the exter-
nal disturbances (such as weather-induced harvest cycles). More common are
theories that stress the second set, trying to identify endogenous causes of
instability in the economic system:
With very few exceptions, all serious explanations are neither purely exog-
enous nor purely endogenous.... Even if one assumes a weather cycle,
the peculiar response ofthe business system, which converts harvest varia-
tions into a general alternation of prosperity and depression, has still to be
explained. On the other hand, a purely endogenous theory is hardly satis-
factory. It is not likely that, without outside shocks, a cyclical movement
would go on forever: and, even ifit did go on, its course would certainly be
9. Thus, most forecasts of the economy's course in the near future use the framework of the
national income accounts, but business cycle indicators are consulted by a large majority of the
forecasters in the samples we have reviewed and are listed along with the informal "GNP models"
as the principal approaches actually employed (see Zamowitz 1971).169 Research during the First 50 Years ofthe National Bureau
profoundly influenced by outside shocks-that is, by changes in the data
(however these may be defined and delimited by economically explained
variables). 10
Most business cycle theories, old and new, are dynamic in the sense of
being designed to "explain how one situation grows out of the foregoing"
(Frisch 1933). Dynamic models incorporate lags in response, that is, relation-
ships among variables whose magnitudes pertain to different points oftime. 11
Such models with lags can generate growth and cycles endogenously, that is,
even without changes in the parameters, in the exogenous variables, or in the
disturbances. More generally, however, changes in these outside "data," which
may be either random or systematic-autonomous, are included in the analysis,
and the models are then used to show how the cyclical response system in the
economy converts such changes into recurrent, pervasive fluctuations. In this
view, external impulses as well as the internal propagation mechanism are
required for the cyclical movements in economic activity to persist; neverthe-
less, some writers who accept this type oftheory still interpret business cycles
as "self-generating," that is, having their essential traits determined primarily
by the economy's organization and modus operandi, not by the nature of any
disturbing causes "outside" the economic system.
It is probably this broad conception of self-generating cyclical fluctuations
that best describes the core of the theory accepted by Wesley Mitchell, al-
though his comprehensive "analytic description" of business cycles includes
some very different elements as well, in subsidiary roles (see M. Friedman
1952). Exogenous forces and accidental events' can accelerate or retard an
expansion, alleviate or aggravate a contraction. These movements, which are
basically endogenous, may also sometimes run into barriers; for example, an
expansion may be halted by the upper limit on the supply ofmoney under the
gold standard. But there is no evidence that the business cycle peaks (troughs)
are typically caused by a concentration of unfavorable (favorable) external
disturbances. Also, the expansionary and contractionary processes, while
"cumulative," are usually self-limiting due to the stresses and imbalances that
they themselves create; they are rarely terminated by any identifiable barriers.
Thus, the economy is definitely not viewed as fundamentally unstable in the
sense ofgenerating potentially "explosive" fluctuations which are constrained
by some limiting factors. 12
The National Bureau studies in business cycles show no commitment to any
particular cyclical theory but rather deal with aspects of various theories and
10. Haberier 1964, p. 9. It may be added, however, that Haberler suggests that methodologi-
cally H[f]or various reasons, it seems desirable, in the explanation ofthe business cycle, to attach
as little importance as possible to the influence ofexternal disturbances" (1964, p. 10).
11. Other dynamic devices closely related to lags include uses of differences or derivatives,
expressing rates ofchange over time, and ofcumulated variables (see Christ 1956).
12. The best known theory ofsuch fluctuations, based on a strong accelerator-multiplier inter-
action, was advanced much later by Hicks (1950). For a critique of this theory, with particular
reference to the related evidence from the business cycle studies ofthe NBER, see Bums 1952a.170 Chapter Five
their empirical validity. This is probably to a large extent a reflection of the
strong influence ofMitchell's work, in which business cycles are treated as a
set of complex phenomena with a plurality of causes and which is itself in
effect a synthesis of elements of several theories, old and new. There are dis-
tinctive concepts here, notably of the differential responses in the price sys-
tem, the lag of selling prices behind buying prices or costs, and the effects of
the consequent changes in profit margins (and the totals and diffusion ofprof-
its) on investment and business activity in general. But there are also other
important components such as the lags of induced expenditures behind re-
ceipts and of investment outlays and deliveries behind investment decisions
and orders, the responses of the monetary and banking system, the resulting
changes in the cost and availability ofcredit, in expectations, etc.] 3 Evidence
collected and evaluated by the National Bureau indicates that these processes,
despite their diversity and complexity, displayed a substantial degree of con-
sistency over the successive cycles. This is shown by the diffusion indexes
that reveal the pervasiveness and early timing ofthe fluctuations in the scope
of expansions and contractions, which are hidden behind the movements of
economic aggregates. It is seen, too, in the persistence oftiming sequences of
different activities: orders, production, shipments, inventory change; invest-
ment commitments, expenditures, and realizations; labor market adjustments;
interest rates, bond and stock prices; industrial prices, costs, and profit mar-
gins. 14
It seems fair to say that research of this kind and scope directly serves the
purpose of analyzing the complex system of processes that are involved in
business cycles rather than the purpose ofconstructing the simplest acceptable
theory that could account for the basic features of business cycles. It works
toward the latter objective but indirectly, in ways resembling a "roundabout"
method of production, which seeks to be more efficient at the cost of being
very time-consuming. Substantial contributions to the "tested knowledge of
business cycles" have thus been made, but they do not add up to an integrated
theory with demonstrated capacity to explain the past and predict the future
phenomena in question. To be sure, this ultimate scientific goal may seem
rather elusive in the context of dealing with complex processes of economic
change which are themselves subject to subtle historical alterations as are,
13. In his essay on Mitchell, M. Friedman writes (1952, p. 271): "The business-cycle theory I
have constructed from Part III of Mitchell's 1913 volume contains practically every element that
is significant in the business-cycle theories that are currently prominent. Here are the multiplier
process, the acceleration principle, the Pigovian cycles ofoptimism and pessimism, the Marshal-
lian and Hawtreyan drain of cash from the banking system and the resultant tightening of the
money market, a decline in the expected yield from new investment at the peak that is the coun-
terpart ofthe Keynesian 'collapse ofthe marginal efficiency ofcapital' except that it is a continu-
ous decline rather than a discontinuous 'collapse,' the Keynesian changes in liquidity preference.
Here, too, is an attempt at a reasoned explanation and integration ofthese phenomena."
14. See Moore 1962 for a report on the early work of the National Bureau on the diffusion
indexes, timing sequences, and other aspects ofbusiness cycles.171 Research during the First 50 Years ofthe National Bureau
also, the structure and institutions ofthe economy and the targets and tools of
economic policy.
5.3 The Concurrent Developments in Theory and Econometrics
More direct attempts to formulate "the" theory of business cycles, mainly
by means of speculative thinking, deductive logic, and more or less abstract
models, account for a large part ofthe literature on the economics ofcyclical
change and growth. There are intellectually attractive problems in economic
dynamics, and some ingenious cyclical models have been constructed. It is,
however, primarily by being confronted with historical evidence that such
models can contribute to our understanding ofthe business cycles, and not all
ofthe models are testable. When the work oftesting and synthesizing is out-
distanced by model construction, this tends to result in a proliferation of dif-
ferent (but typically overlapping) theoretical constructs, not in progress to-
ward a unified, validated theory. The latter clearly requires that both empirical
and theoretical studies be pursued so as to profit from the quasi-symbiotic
interaction ofselective fact and disciplined thought (Bums 1969, pp. 12-13).
The decade of the 1930s saw the beginning of three important develop-
ments: (1) the formulation and interpretation ofexplicit and complete mathe-
matical models of business cycles in highly aggregative form (Frisch 1933;
Kalecki 1935; Samuelson 1939); (2) the reformulation of macroeconomic
theory (Keynes 1936); and (3) the construction of econometric models of
business cycles (Tinbergen 1938-39). These were originally rather distinct
approaches to the study of the economy and its movements, but their evolu-
tion soon came to be shaped by strong cross-influences, both between the
theoretical and the econometric models and between either type ofmodels and
the post-or neo-Keynesian analysis.
The mathematical models include a system in which a given disturbance
sets off fluctuations ofan ever smaller amplitude, that is, a damped movement
toward a new equilibrium. Frisch presents a linear model of this type, where
external shocks keep alive the fluctuations in spite of dampening. He notes
that the shocks need not be entirely or necessarily random and sees one of
their sources in technological innovations, whose role in the economic process
of growth and cycles was stressed by Schumpeter (see Frisch 1933; sec. VI;
Schumpeter 1934, 1939). Another source of such autonomous impulses,
which may be of increasing importance, is the public sector of the economy,
whose rapid growth in recent times is a well-known matter ofrecord.
Several early trade cycle theories have a basically Keynesian orientation but
different dynamic features. Thus, Harrod (1936) stressed the acceleration
principle; Kalecki (1937), the lag between investment decisions and realiza-
tions; and Kaldor (1940), investment and saving as nonlinear functions ofthe
levels ofoutput and capital. Samuelson (1939) has shown how combining the
multiplier with the accelerator results in a model which can produce cycles172 Chapter Five
that are either damped or constant or explosive, depending on the numerical
values of the two interacting parameters. An endogenous model by Hicks
(1950) specifies the values that would produce explosive fluctuations but uses
nonlinear constraints to generate cycles around an upward equilibrium trend
in national output.
These and other accelerator-multiplier and nonlinear models illustrate a va-
riety of interesting problems in economic dynamics (see Kalecki 1935, 1937;
Harrod 1936; Kaldor 1940; Metzler 1941, 1946; Goodwin 1951). They are,
however, likely to be more useful for the (somewhat circular) purpose of
studying the essential elements and causes ofthe observed fluctuations of the
economy. Their explanatory or predictive power has not been demonstrated.
The heavy emphasis on induced investment, with high values for the acceler-
ator, makes these models highly unstable, a feature others found difficult to
reconcile with the historical (particularly, recent) course ofthe economy.
Reactions against the limitations ofthe endogenous accelerator models can
be found, in various explicit or implicit forms, in both theoretical and applied
work (see notably Duesenberry 1958). The result is a new emphasis on the
plurality ofcauses and diversity ofelements in the individual business cycles,
which will remind the reader ofMitchell's analysis and the evidence presented
in the National Bureau studies. The similarities extend to several important
components ofthe theory, notably the role ofconstruction costs and profits in
the explanation ofinvestment. 15 There is certainly much less affinity between
the Bureau's approach and those endogenous models that depend principally
and rather rigidly on the acceleration principle. 16
The construction ofaggregate econometric models was originally (as in the
pioneering work by Tinbergen 1938-39, 1940) strongly oriented toward busi-
ness cycle research. In the postwar period, work on such models intensified
and broadened, and its results are now being widely used for various pur-
poses, including forecasting, tests of macroeconomic hypotheses, and simu-
lation of the likely effects of alternative policies. The models for the U.S.
economy progressed from annual to quarterly units; they vary greatly in size
and complexity; but the evolution so far appears to be in the direction ofever
larger systems. The models, for the United States as well as for the other
countries, generally utilize the structure of national income accounts and are
15. See Duesenberry 1958, chs. 5 and 7. Important antecedent models featuring profits in the
investment functions are found in Tinbergen 1938-39; L. R. Klein 1951; L. R. Klein and Gold-
berger 1955; and Meyer and Kuh 1957.
16. See Bums 1950 for a critique ofthe Hicks trade cycle theory. It is true that self-generating
cycles are the central concepts in the work ofMitchell and others at the National Bureau and that
the role of exogenous factors, though by no means disregarded, is treated as secondary. But the
argument seems persuasive that the main ideas in the NBER approach (that the nature ofthe cycle
is determined primarily by the structure and institutions of the economy and that both prediction
and control ofthe cycle must be sought in the understanding ofthe "processes which run regularly
within the world of business itself") would not be substantively changed even if the role of the
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for the most part of Keynesian persuasion. Many have similar features. This
similarity in part reflects the importance and influence in this area ofthe work
by Lawrence R. Klein and his associates. 17
Since the views about the nature and causes of business cycles are quite
diverse, as illustrated by the preceding brief survey of the different theories
and models, it is important to ask what light the econometric studies throw
upon the relation of the exogenous and endogenous factors that may be in-
volved. The question must be raised in the context of two developments: (1)
the increasing emphasis on exogenous factors, among which are included po-
litical and economic policy changes, and (2) the challenge to certain tenets
and applications of Keynesian theory raised in writings of several monetary
economists, particularly Milton Friedman. In what follows, attention will be
given to these topics.
5.4 Business-Cycle Simulations
In a study of the Klein-Goldberger econometric model of the U.S. econ-
omy, Irma Adelman and Frank Adelman (1959) concluded that nonstochastic
simulations based on smooth extrapolations ofthe exogenous variables do not
enable that model to generate cyclical movements resembling the historically
observed fluctuations, nor do "type I" stochastic simulations, with random
shocks superimposed upon the extrapolated values of the exogenous vari-
abies. They found, however, that "type II" stochastic simulations, with ran-
dom shocks introduced into each of the fitted equations, do result in cycles
whose average duration, conformity, and timing characteristics agree broadly
with the measures developed by the National Bureau. They interpreted these
results as consistent with the Frisch hypothesis that highly developed capital-
istic economies react to random impulses so as to convert them into the per-
vasive and recurrent fluctuations described as the business cycle. Similarly, in
his survey of 16 U.S. and foreign aggregate econometric models, Hickman
(1969, p. 429) reported that "the weight of their evidence suggests strongly
that modem mixed enterprise systems are characterized by stable response
mechanisms and small dynamic multipliers. If that be so, then the cycles of
experience must be kept alive by exogenous stimuli."
In a comprehensive investigation ofeconometric model simulations, a team
ofNational Bureau researchers, aided by the active cooperation ofthe builders
ofseveral quarterly U.S. models, found that nonstochastic sample-period sim-
ulations produce strongly damped cyclical movements (Zamowitz, Boschan,
and Moore 1972). Only the first one or two recessions covered are, in some
attenuated form, reproduced in such simulations; beyond that, the declines in
17. See L. R. Klein 1950, 1964; L. R. Klein and Goldberger 1955; Evans and Klein 1967. See
the survey articles by Nerlove (1966) and Hickman (1969) for references to other U.S. and foreign
econometric models.174 Chapter Five
the overall aggregates tend to disappear. In simulations extending for a hun-
dred quarters into the future, the projected series are in general smooth and
trend dominated, indicating that these models do not generate cyclical move-
ment endogenously. When shocks are applied to these long ex ante simula-
tions, many fluctuations do occur, but they are in large part too short to qualify
as cyclical, according to comparisons with the NBER reference cycle mea-
surements. The simulations based on autocorrelated shocks are much
smoother and often appear more plausible than those with serially uncorre-
lated shocks.
The models examined in these simulation studies are in general stable. If it
could be assumed that they are correctly specified, these experiments would
provide some support for the Wicksell-Slutsky-Frisch theory ofa dynamically
stable (damped) response mechanism, with fluctuations being renewed and
"kept alive" by erratic shocks. The support would appear strong in the case of
the Adelmans' study and some of the models examined by Hickman. It must
be viewed as much more limited and qualified, however, as far as the more
recent and comprehensive reports of the 1969 NBER conference at Harvard
are concerned. 18 Here the evidence suggests that random disturbances alone
produce only weak fluctuations, visible in deviations from trends rather than
in the stochastically simulated series proper. Smoother and longer (but simi-
larly weak) fluctuations appear when the shocks to the equations are serially
correlated. The cyclical aspects of the simulations would probably be
strengthened by application ofautocorrelated shocks not only to the equations
with endogenous variables but also to the exogenous variables. 19 There are
reasons to expect that wars, policy actions, technological change (innova-
tions), etc., would indeed frequently result in autocorrelated "autonomous"
shocks to the economy.
However, the econometric models in question may not be correctly speci-
fied. Ifso, then the autocorrelations observed in the sample residuals for many
equations in these models may in the main reflect these misspecifications.
Frequent caveats on this score are expressed in the work on econometric
model simulations (Adelman and Adelman 1959; p. 301; Hickman 1969, pp.
428-29; and remarks by de Leeuw, Hickman, and Zamowitz et al. in Hick-
man 1969).
It is not easy to document specification errors in the models; economic
theory provides broad guidelines, but it does not prevent arguments among
economists with different views about what the correct formulations ought to
18. These include, in addition to the NBER study by Zamowitz, Boschan, and Moore (1972),
Evans, Klein, and Saito 1972; Green, Liebenberg, and Hirsch 1972; Howrey 1972. See also the
introduction in Hickman 1972.
19. A few such simulations were run for the Office of Business Economics (OBE) model by
Green, Liebenberg, and Hirsch (1972), with the result that cycle declines were increased in am-
plitude and duration. But the effects of shocks in exogenous variables were not given adequate
attention in the 1969 NBER conference studies.175 Research during the First 50 Years of the National Bureau
be. Large-scale, complex models, in particular, pose many detailed specifi-
cation problems that theory and empirical research have not yet been able to
resolve with the existing information. The best tests available here are indi-
rect, based on the predictive value ofthe model (see Christ 1968).
5.5 The Role ofMoney
According to many critics, a major source of specification errors in recent
econometric models is the neglect or inadequate handling ofthe monetary and
financial factors. This view is stressed particularly by those economists who
take a "monetarist" approach to macroeconomics (e.g., M. Friedman 1959,
1968, 1970b; M. Friedman and Meiselman 1964; M. Friedman and Schwartz
1963a, 1963b, 1970; Cagan 1965, 1966). However, some economists basi-
cally sympathetic to the so-called neo-Keynesian concepts have also urged
that greater attention be given to the monetary and financial sectors in econo-
metric models, and efforts in this direction are apparent in the latest models. 20
Evidence assembled by Friedman and Schwartz leads them to conclude
(1963b, p. 63) that "there is an extremely strong case for the proposition that
sizable changes in the rate of change in the money stock are a necessary and
sufficient condition for sizable changes in the rate of change in the money
income." For the minor U.S. economic fluctuations, "the case for a monetary
explanation is not nearly so strong," but "it is plausible to suppose that
changes in the stock of money played an important independent role, though
certainly the evidence for these minor movements does not rule out other in-
terpretations" (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963b, pp. 55, 63). The mechanism
whereby monetary changes are transmitted in ways that can produce cyclical
fluctuations in income is viewed as a series ofreciprocal adjustments ofstocks
to flows, which involve variable but often lengthy lags. Absorption of newly
injected money, for example, requires alteration ofyields and prices ofdiffer-
ent assets, which creates discrepancies between the actual and desired port-
folios and prompts the banks and the public to reshuffle their balance sheets in
the effort to reduce such discrepancies. The first impact of an increase in the
monetary growth that usually occurs early in contraction is on the financial
markets (bonds, then equities), but eventually the stimulus spreads to the mar-
kets for goods and services, causing rises in investment and in payments for
real resources at large. In the process, interest rates first decline and then rise,
the reversal being due to the increase in spending, income, and prices. The
process will tend to overshoot and involve cyclical, presumably damped, ad-
justments to each monetary "shock."
20. See Minsky 1963, pp. 65-66. The increased concern about the role of the monetary-
financial factors and their interaction with the "real" factors can also be seen in the reports on the
structure and performance of the large-scale Brookings-SSRC model and especially ofthe more
recent FRB-MIT-Penn model (de Leeuw 1965; de Leeuw and Gramlich 1968; and Ando and
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This hypothesis envisages disturbances in the growth of money supply that
induce cyclical adjustments and recur frequently enough to prevent the fluc-
tuations from dying out. The stock of money is subject to large changes that
are autonomous, that is, not directly attributable to contemporary changes in
income and prices. Thus, the monetary changes are here treated as a mainly
exogenous and "causal" factor in a narrow but important sense.
Formally, the model of the economy that is conveyed by these studies is
dynamically stable, converting random or systematic disturbances into cycli-
cal fluctuations in major economic variables. Substantively, it is the monetary
factor that is the major source of these disturbances. In particular, this factor
is regarded as basically responsible for the major economic fluctuations; the
evidence for the minor ones, taken alone, would not be inconsistent with the
alternative view "that the close relation between money and business reflected
primarily the influence of business on money" (Friedman and Schwartz,
1963b, p. 55). In most applications, however, especially by other monetarists,
the distinction between the major and minor fluctuations plays no operational
role, and monetary changes are treated generally as the main independent
force determining the movements in money income that are associated (some-
times identified) with business cycles. The main rival theory, namely, that
"real" rather than monetary factors are critical, with investment being the
main motive force in business cycles, is explicitly rejected, but the monetary
hypothesis is also sharply distinguished from the earlier "credit" theories of
the cycle. This conception of business cycles as essentially a monetary phe-
nomenon (resembling the "dance ofthe dollar" view of Irving Fisher) is also
clearly different from the much broader conception ofMitchell. 2 I
5.6 Assessing Policies and Understanding Business Cycles
There is a marked tendency in recent discussions of problems of inflation
and recession to emphasize the power ofeconomic policy to do both good and
evil-to stabilize and disturb. According to a view held by many Keynesians,
the economy is rather unstable, in need of being stimulated by fiscal policies
at some times and ofbeing restrained by fiscal and perhaps monetary policies
at other times. According to the monetarist view, the economy is fundamen-
tally stable, and major business cycle movements are primarily attributable to
"inappropriate movements in the money stock"; economic instability can
therefore be minimized by controlling the rate ofmonetary expansion (Ander-
sen and Carlson 1970, p. 8). These are opposite positions, yet they have one
important point in common, namely, that economic policy is potent enough to
be, ifcorrect, a major force working to promote or restore economic stability;
and also to be, iferroneous, a major cause of, or at least contributor to, eco-
21. This statement is, of course, entirely consistent with the fact that Mitchell attached great
importance to the role of money in the structure and cyclical movements ofcontemporary indus-
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nomic instability. It all depends only on the choice of the right policies at the
right time, provided that the choice is defined broadly to include self-imposed
institutional rules and automatic stabilizers as well as discretionary policies.
As usual, such positions are often exaggerated and vulgarized in popular
debate. Also, extreme views on the powers of stabilization policies are not
new. 22 But the increasing emphasis on exogenous and particularly policy fac-
tors in the analysis of business fluctuations is so manifest in recent profes-
sional writing as to merit serious attention. Is this emphasis based on new
evidence or a revival of some old beliefs? Has it increased too much or too
little orjust about right?
The evidence from econometric models and related simulation studies tends
to support the view that exogenous factors playa major role. 23 Policy changes
are generally treated as exogenous in these models. But it must again be rec-
ognized that all these models represent only different ways ofcombining frag-
ments of uncertain knowledge and outright hunches; they certainly contain
serious errors ofcommission and omission, are implemented with very imper-
fect data, and are valuable primarily as vehicles of a continuing search for
more and firmer understanding of the economy in motion. The models differ
not only with respect to the underlying theories or intuitions, that is, in speci-
fication, but also in size and complexity, sample periods, and methods of es-
timation and application to forecasting. With so many sources of incompara-
bility, which cannot be eliminated, neutralized, or fully allowed for (without
removing the distinctive properties of the models), conclusive discrimination
among the models is very difficult. However, predictive and dynamic simula-
tion tests, which are probably more convincing than the others, suggest at
least a few broad propositions, as follows: (1) Both monetary and fiscal policy
variables have significant effects on aggregate spending; neither set should be
treated as dominant at all times or as negligible, and improvements in dealing
with both sets payoffin better performance ofthe model. 24 (2) The combined
influence of both sets of policy variables is far from sufficient to account for
the systematic component of changes in total spending (let alone for other
22. Thus M. Friedman (1968, pp. 1, 5) reminds us that in the 1920s "it came to be widely
believed that a new era had arrived in which business cycles had been rendered obsolete by ad-
vances in monetary technology.... The Great Contraction destroyed this naive attitude. Opinion
swung to the other extreme." He expresses the fear that "now as then, the pendulum may have
swung too far, that, now as then, we are in danger of assigning to monetary policy a larger role
than it can perform."
23. As noted by Hickman (1972, p. 11), "Some classes of shocks may generate cycles when
acting upon the models studied in this Conference. It should be emphasized, however, that broad-
ening the class ofshocks to include perturbations in exogenous variables-and to allow for serial
correlation in the disturbances to equations and exogenous variables-diminishes the role of
model structure as a cycle maker."
24. See Andersen and Carlson 1970; Andersen and Jordan 1968, 1969; and de Leeuw and
Kalchbrenner 1969. The St. Louis model in its present version (April 1970) indicates that the
fiscal effects, though weaker and more temporary than the monetary effects, are significant. See
also the references to the analysis of the FRB-MIT-Penn model in n. 20; in this larger and more
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important elements in economic fluctuations).25 (3) Business cycle analysis
and forecasting can benefit from econometric studies of structural models of
various degrees of complexity, but inadequate knowledge and data, and per-
haps also problems of coordinating the work of a large group ofexperts, im-
pose definite limits upon the size of potentially useful models at the present
time. 26
There are, ofcourse, good and easily understandable reasons why changes
in economic policies attract much greater and more general attention now than
in times past, when both the weight of the government and the extent of its
intervention in the economy were much smaller. But precisely because this is
so, the chances have also increased for overestimation ~f the potency ofgov-
ernmental policies. Policy changes tend to become a matter of public record,
whereas the changes wrought by forces within the economy are more diffuse
and subtle, hence often difficult to discern. Moreover, policy changes interact
with other "outside disturbances" and endogenous forces so that the task of
isolating and evaluating the effects of these factors on the movement of na-
tional income and other aggregates is very arduous, even conceptually and a
fortiori in empirical applications. The policy variables can be exogenous only
in the sense that they do not respond to current movements in the endogenous
variables. They certainly do respond to earlier developments in the economy
as policymakers try to counteract undesirable trends due to either internal
causes or external disturbances (including the influence of past policies).
These corrective efforts must frequently concur with the more "autonomous"
policy initiatives, and both affect aggregate spending, income, etc., only with
lags that may be substantial and variable. When these lagged effects are cu-
mulated and attributed fully to policy changes, the influence ofthese changes
may often be significantly overestimated.
This way of looking at economic policies has however, other implications
as well, namely, that the governmental actions may at times tend to cancel
each other or have net destabilizing effects. 27 One explanation of the latter
centers on the difference between the immediate and the delayed conse-
25. Forexample, the St. Louis equation "explains" nearly two thirds ofthe variance ofchanges
in GNP with changes in money stock and high-employment federal expenditures alone. This is a
rather high R2 considering the first-difference form of the model, but contemporaneous values of
the policy variables as well as short-lag values are included, and there can be little doubt that there
is some bias in this single-equation approach: the influence is not entirely from money to GNP but
also in the opposite direction. Other formulations designed to reduce this basic and much-debated
problem have led to lower correlations (de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner 1969).
26. These limitations are stressed by several reviewers of the Brookings-SSRC model, which
contains several hundred equations (see Mosbaek 1968, pp. 194-96; Griliches 1968, pp. 215-
34). On the other hand, the single-equation or reduced-form models such as the St. Louis model
may be used to study the influence of certain exogenous policy factors, but they are much too
"underdeveloped" and structurally undetermined to be helpful in business cycle research.
27. This includes the "policy cycles" as an extreme case of destabilizing action. Maddison
(1960) and Gilbert (1962) argue that in Western Europe government intervention in the postwar
years succeeded in limiting fluctuations in output to a narrower range at higher levels but also
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quences of a policy, as in M. Friedman's (1968) analysis of the monetary
authority's attempts to peg either interest rates or the rate of unemployment.
Another explanation would have policies alternate between the immediate
goals of fighting inflation and of fighting unemployment, with the efforts to
contain the rise in prices leading to a business recession or slowdown and
efforts to reduce unemployment leading to renewed inflationary pressures, as
in some analyses based on the Phillips curve (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman
1963). The two hypotheses are not logically inconsistent and could both be
valid. There is evidence to support the view that reactions to discretionary
policy shifts involve patterns of lengthy and varying lags, although measure-
ments ofthe distributed lags in the effect ofmonetary policy vary considerably
and are far from conclusive. There is also evidence to support the relationship
between wage changes and unemployment as summarized by the Phillips
curve, although it is plausible that in the long run no stable trade-off would
exist between unemployment and anticipated inflation (M. Friedman 1968;
Phelps 1968).
In trying to evaluate any advance in economics, it is proper to take a broad
view. We are dealing essentially with gradual processes of increased under-
standing that cannot avoid occasional setbacks. Thus seen in this brief and
very incomplete survey, the work ofthe National Bureau has resulted in many
important and potentially useful contributions.
It is much more difficult to achieve and demonstrate definite progress di-
rectly measurable in terms ofthe resulting improvements in dealing with cur-
rent economic problems. It is clear that we know much less about the working
ofeconomic stabilization policies than we need for both an objective appraisal
ofthe past and as a guide to such conduct ofcurrent affairs as would command
wide professional agreement. It is certainly difficult, even with the benefit of
hindsight, to decide such questions as whether any ofthe postwar U.S. reces-
sions could have been avoided by better policies and, if so, how and at what
alternative costs. But underlying such questions is the central problem ofbusi-
ness cycle theory to which frequent reference was made here: What are the
relative roles of exogenous factors and endogenous processes in determining
the course ofthe economy? There is great need for well-designed research on
this subject, the eventual results of which could contribute greatly to a better
understanding ofcurrent policy issues.